Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors.

Rozy parveen

College:- jamia hamdard

Editor:- Malla Greeshma

Case Title

Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors.

Court

Supreme Court

Citation

1985 SCC (3) 545

Bench

Y.V. Chandrachud (CJI), O. Chinnappa Reddy (J), S. Murtaza Fazal Ali (J), V.D. Tulzapurkar and A. Varadaraja (J)

Date of judgement

10/07/1985

Respondent

Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors.

Petitioner

Olga Tellis

INTRODUCTION

In Indian constitutional jurisprudence, the case of Olga Tellis & Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation is significant particularly when it comes to determining the extent of Fundamental Rights under Part III of the Constitution. A five-judge Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court rendered the decision, which is generally considered to be a humane and progressive interpretation of the Right to Life under Article 21[2]. The Court acknowledged that the Right to Livelihood is an integral aspect of the Right to Life. Due to extreme poverty and a shortage of affordable housing, slum and pavement dwellers in Bombay (now Mumbai) were forcibly evicted after years of living on public lands and pavements. In the interests of public order, sanitation and urban planning, the Bombay Municipal Corporation attempted to demolish these homes using the statutory authority granted by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. But the petitioners contested this decision in the Supreme Court, arguing that the eviction without rehabilitation or notice constituted a flagrant violation of their fundamental rights especially those guaranteed by Articles 14[3], 19 and 21[4]. The Court had to decide whether people living in unauthorised encroachments on public property could claim the protection of fundamental rights and whether natural justice required the authorities to give them a fair hearing before evicting them in order to resolve the conflict between individual rights and state interest. Although it did not legalise encroachments, the Court's ground-breaking response recognised the social realities of urban poverty and emphasised the State's constitutional duty to defend the impoverisher’s basic survival and dignity. This ruling is significant not only because it upholds the Right to Livelihood but also because it establishes a standard for balancing Fundamental Rights with Directive Principles of State Policy. It acknowledges that, even though they are not expressly enforceable economic rights like the right to food, shelter and work are essential to effectively enjoying life and liberty within a socialist welfare-focused constitutional framework. 

FACT OF THE CASE

The petitioners in this case were slum dwellers and pavement dwellers in Bombay (now Mumbai) who had been living on public lands and pavements for a number of years due to a lack of affordable housing options and poverty. These people had moved to the city in quest of employment and had built makeshift shelters and huts in order to survive. Citing issues with public obstruction, sanitation and city planning, the Bombay Municipal Corporation, acting under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 issued orders for their eviction and the destruction of their shelters. The petitioners, however, contested this decision in the Supreme Court, arguing that it would be a flagrant violation of their fundamental rights to be forced to leave their home without warning, hearing, or rehabilitation. They specifically claimed that the eviction violated their rights under the Indian Constitution's Article 21 (Right to Life), Article 19(1) (e)[5] (Right to reside and settle in any part of India), and Article 19(1) (g)[6] (Right to practise any profession or occupation). They claimed that without shelter one would unavoidably lose one's means of subsistence and dignity, rendering survival itself impossible. The petitioners argued that the eviction notices were not only arbitrary but also cruel and unconstitutional because they were served without providing them with a hearing or any other alternative arrangement. 

ISSUES

1.     Whether the eviction of pavement dwellers without prior notice or an opportunity of being heard amounts to a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution?

2.      Whether the Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution includes within its scope the Right to Livelihood?

3.     Whether unauthorised occupation of public property by pavement dwellers can be protected under the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution?

4.     Whether the actions taken by the Bombay Municipal Corporation were arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural justice? 

CONTENSION OF THE PETITIONER

The petitioners argued that the right to livelihood is a necessary part of the right to life protected by Article 21 of the Constitution. They were Bombay pavement and slum dwellers. They said that it would violate their fundamental rights and basic human dignity to evict them without offering them any other kind of housing or rehabilitation, which would effectively leave them jobless and homeless and force them into poverty, famine, and social marginalisation. The petitioners stressed that their inability to pay for city rental housing due to financial hardship and necessity rather than choice had compelled them to live on pavements. Furthermore, it was argued that the lack of notice or a hearing before to eviction constituted a flagrant breach of natural justice norms, particularly in cases where their lives was at risk. Additionally, they cited Articles 38[7], 39[8], 41[9], and 43[10] of the Directive Principles of State Policy, arguing that the State is obligated by the Constitution to advance social welfare, ensure a respectable standard of living, and provide sufficient means of subsistence for all citizens, particularly the impoverished. The petitioners emphasised that the lack of formal housing does not give a welfare state the right to prosecute its impoverished inhabitants as criminals.It was argued that the lack of notice or a hearing before to eviction constituted a flagrant breach of natural justice norms, particularly in cases where their lives was at risk. Additionally, they cited Articles 38, 39, 41, and 43 of the Directive Principles of State Policy, arguing that the State is obligated by the Constitution to advance social welfare, ensure a respectable standard of living, and provide sufficient means of subsistence for all citizens, particularly the impoverished. The petitioners emphasised that the lack of formal housing does not give a welfare state the right to prosecute its impoverished inhabitants as criminals.

Additionally, they argued that evicting them from their homes would ruin their means of subsistence because many of them worked in petty occupations that boosted the urban economy, such as street vending, rag picking, domestic help, and other informal sector activities. Furthermore, the petitioners contended that the State cannot avoid accountability by just designating them as encroachers, particularly in light of the fact that it has not offered any comprehensive rehabilitation plans or cheap housing programs. They asked the Court to defend them against capricious and cruel governmental action and to acknowledge that the Constitution should be construed in a way that preserves the principles of justice, equality, and human dignity. 

CONTENSION OF THE RESPONDENT

The petitioners were deemed to be encroachers and unauthorised occupants of public property, and their occupation was obviously unlawful under municipal rules according to the respondents, which included the Bombay Municipal Corporation and the State authorities. They maintained that while the right to livelihood is significant, it cannot be construed so far as to grant the right to squat or intrude on public lands and pavements, which are intended for the use of the general public and urban infrastructure. The authorities added that their actions were well within the scope of the statutory authority conferred by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which gave them the ability to eradicate the encroachments for the sake of urban planning, public health and safety. It was claimed that these hutments and slums on pavements presented major risks to traffic flow, sanitation and general municipal administration. Furthermore, the respondents cautioned that allowing such illegal settlements would promote criminal activity, jeopardise statutory planning initiatives, and create a risky precedent that would disturb metropolitan areas' administrative governance, civic amenities, and public order. 

JUDGEMENT

Justice Y.V. Chandrachud gave the ruling in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation on behalf of a five-judge Constitution Bench that was unanimous. The Supreme Court addressed the predicament of pavement dwellers as well as the legal duties of municipal authorities in a fair and compassionate manner, acknowledging the complexity of urban government.

The Court decided that although though the petitioners were using public property without permission, they could not be considered trespassers or criminals in the traditional sense. Instead of choosing to live on the streets and in slums, they were forced to do so by social injustice and economic need. Since no one chooses to live in a slum or on a street, the Court recognised that denying them housing without providing them with other options would be cruel and incompatible with the fundamental guarantees of justice and dignity.

According to Article 21 of the Constitution, the right to livelihood falls under the purview of the right to life. This was the judgment's most important legal finding. As the Court noted: "If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood."

The Court further emphasised that no one has a basic right to infringe on public property. No one, including those who are impoverished, has the legal right to squat or settle on sidewalks or other public areas. Nonetheless, procedural justice ought to be adhered to. Thus, the Court decided that it would be against natural justice principles to evict such individuals without first providing them a chance to be heard.

The court partially affirmed the Bombay Municipal Corporation's action, ruling that although the eviction could not be prevented because the occupation was illegal, it must be carried out in a fair, reasonable, and humane way. In addition to requiring that the pavement dwellers be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before any further evictions, it instructed the authorities to refrain from evicting them until alternative plans for their relocation were made.The State has a duty under the Directive Principles of State Policy to provide shelter and a means of subsistence for its citizens, and this duty must guide the exercise of executive powers, the Court ruled, even though the encroachments could not be legalised. 

CONCLUSION

A landmark constitutional case that elevated the problems of the urban poor to the fore of Indian legal discourse is Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. The case, which started when Mumbai's slum and pavement inhabitants were evicted, forced the Supreme Court to consider the intricate connection between unlawful encroachment and basic human rights. The petitioners said that their right to shelter under Articles 14, 19, and 21 had been violated and that their very survival and means of subsistence would be in jeopardy if they were forced to leave. The respondents, however, defended their acts as legal and essential for public safety, sanitation, and urban government. No one has the legal right to encroach on public land, but the Right to Life under Article 21 includes the Right to Livelihood, and no eviction should be carried out without following the proper legal procedures, which include notice, hearing, and fair treatment, the Court held after considering all relevant factors. In view of the Directive Principles, the Court further underlined the State's constitutional obligation to promote the welfare of the underprivileged. Because it broadened the application of Article 21 and reaffirmed the idea that constitutional rights must be read with empathy and consideration for the underprivileged, the decision thus represented a sea change in Indian jurisprudence.

REFERENCE

1.    Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 545; AIR 1986 SC 180; 1985 Supp (2) SCR 51.

2.    The Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14, 19(1)(e), 19(1)(g), 21, 38, 39, 41, and 43.

3.    Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.

4.     Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Judgment delivered on 10th July 1985, Supreme Court of India.

5.    Indian Kanoon. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. Retrieved from: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/709776/

6.    LawBhoomi. Case Summary: Olga Tellis v. BMC. Retrieved from: https://lawbhoomi.com/olga-tellis-v-bombay-municipal-corporation/

[1] 1986 AIR 180, (1985)  3 SCC 545.

[2] The constitution of India, 1950, art 21.

[3] The constitution of India, 1950, art 14.

[4] The constitution of India, 1950, art 21.

[5] The constitution of India, 1950, art 19 (1) (e).

[6] The constitution of India, 1950, art 19 (1) (g).

[7] The constitution of India, 1950, art 38.

[8] The constitution of India, 1950, art 39.

[9] The constitution of India, 1950, art 41.

[10] The constitution of India, 1950, art 43.