INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF KERALA, 2018

Palak P Kumar,

Amity University Haryana

CITATION	(2018) 10 SCC 689
DATE OF JUDGEMENT	28th SEPTEMBER, 2018
COURT	SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
APPELLANT	INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
RESPONDENT	STATE OF KERALA
BENCH	CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA DIPAK MISRA, JUSTICE A.M KHANWILKAR, JUSTICE R.F NARIMAN, JUSTICE D.Y CHANDRACHUD AND JUSTICE INDU MALHOTRA

INTRODUCTION

It is well known that women were deprived for a long time when it came to equal rights, rights which are basic as decision-making in the public domain. However, the world is changing for the better. The Shah Bano Case is one crucial landmark court ruling, which has reinstated the rights of Muslim women over the arbitrary practice of triple talaq.

The Sabarimala Temple in Kerala, a revered pilgrimage site for Hindus dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, has become a focal point in the ongoing debate over women's rights. Traditionally, women of menstruating age have been barred from entering the temple, a practice that has sparked widespread controversy and protest.

This case highlights the relentless efforts of value advocating for the right to access the Sabarimala Temple Shrine. The Ayyappa Temple has been at the centre of a heated discussion regarding the restrictions placed on women aged 10 to 50, which many argue are discriminatory.

Petitioners, in this case, have reached critical constitutional issues, asserting that the restrictions and womens entry violates several major articles of the Constitution of India, which include the following

1.     Article 14 - Equality before Law.

2.     Article 15 - Protection of Discrimination on Grounds of Religion, Race, Caste, Sex or Place of Birth.

3.     Article 17 - Abolition of Untouchability.

4.     Article 25 - Freedom of Conscience and Free Profession, Practice and Propagation of Religion.

5.     Article 26 - Freedom to Manage Religious Affairs. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Sabarimala Temple, devoted to Lord Ayyappa, is located in the Periyar Tiger Reserve in the hills of Pathanamthitta District of Kerala. This site observes a tradition of not allowing women in their ‘menstruating years’ which in their view is for worship only.

Many female pilgrims tried to trespass the Temple only to be brutalised and prevented from breaching it. In response, five women lawyers formed a group and petitioned the Supreme Court in a bid to overturn the order of the Kerala High Court and the restraining affidavits in question, which most people argued that it is only the priest, who determines the customs of the temple. 

In 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association, filed a petition in the supreme court for assistance pursuing to end the discrimination against women at the Sabarimala Temple. They contended that this tradition violates the principles of equal protection allotted to women in Article 14 and also the intersection of religion which is under Article 25 for the female devotees.

The State argued that the ultimate adjudication on these disputes with the temple's priest’s. Legal control over the management of the Sabarimala Temple is administered by the Travancore Devaswom Board. According to Article 26 of the Constitution, “every religious denomination has the right to manage its only internal affairs”. Furthermore, the Sabarimala customary practice was protected by Rule 3(b)[iii], which stated that women were to be seated on the outskirts of religious proceedings if such a practice was customary.

This decision was in 1991, challenged in Kerala High Court under the case of S. Mahendran vs. The Secretary, Travancore[1] The court approved of the exclusion, stating that it was justified and did not go against the constitution as it was practised for a long period of time.

The Supreme Court constituted a bench of three judges to take up the case as an important matter on 7th March, 2008. By an order, dated 17th August, 2006, the alleged parties were duly notified. Hearings in this case comment after a long gap of 7 years on 11th January, 2016.

The case was placed before the bench on 20th February, 2017 and the court confided that it intended to send the matter to the Constitutional Court. The matter was finally handed over on 13th October, 2017 to a bench headed by Justice Dipak Mishra, Justice R. Bhanumati, Justice Ashok Bhushan. The Constitutional Court, resolved with a judgement on 28th September, 2018.

The court ruled that the prohibition of women in the Sabarimala Temple is in violation of the right of women, aged between 10-50 years with a majority of 4:1. At the same time, it deemed Rule 3(B) of the Public Worships Act (Special Provisions) as ‘unconstitutional’.

Justice Indu Malhotra’s opinion was presented in a wider context that in a secular state it is not a task for the wait quotes to impose religious rituals, which ought to be practised by the followers themselves. 

ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT

ISSUE 1 - Whether the exclusionary practices rooted in the biological letter of the female gender orientation is violative of the pith and substance of Articles 14, 15 and 17 and not protected by the limitation of morality as employed in Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India?

ISSUE 2 - Does this exclusive memory practice amount to defining the right of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution of India?

ISSUE 3 -  Whether the Ayyappa Temple is a religion or denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution of India, and if yes then notwithstanding such denomination being administered under the legal authority and funded under Article 290A of the constitution, is entitled to practise which is violative of Articles - 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51(A)(e).

ISSUE 4 - Whether Rule 3 of the 1965 Rules, enabled a religious denomination to bar the entry of a class of women between the age group of 10-50 years to the Sabarimala Temple?

ISSUE 5 -     Is Rule 3(b) of the Rules of 1965 ultra vires to the Act of 1965

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS

It was contended that exclusionary practices bring in demarcation against the women as a class, since the restriction to women aged between 10-50 years.

In Bennet Coleman and Co. and Ors, vs. Union of India[2], it is said that this segregation is just on the ground of sex because the organic element of the feminine cycle radiates from the attributes of a specific sex.

It was contended that such a practice, which is exclusionary based on gender, is violative of Article 15(1) and 15(2)(b), which prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex. This traditional practice is argued to be a serious infringement  of Article 14, as it lacks a legitimate constitutional basis. Additionally, it undermines the personal right of individuals to practise their religion freely. Since menstruation is not a permanent state, the ongoing exclusion of women from participation based on this temporary condition infringes upon their fundamental rights.

Furthermore, an argument was advanced regarding the status of Lord Ayyappa as not embodying a separate religious denomination in itself. The slight variations in rituals do not qualify the devotees as a distinct religious group. If the followers of Lord Ayyappa were to establish themselves as a religious denomination, the prohibition against women attending would not constitute an essential or fundamental practice of that faith. Consequently, such a ban is unnecessary and infringes upon both Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, and Article 17, which abolishes untouchability and discriminatory practices.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE ENTRY OF WOMEN

The arguments presented by the petitioners advocating for the admission of women into the Sabarimala Temple were compelling and grounded in the principles of gender equality. They asserted that menstruation should not be viewed as a source of impurity and that women inherently possess equal rights to enter the temple, just as men do. Critics of the existing restrictions argue that the beliefs surrounding menstruation are steeped in unjust discrimination, equating them to gender-based inequality.

In support of this viewpoint, Kerala's Chief Minister, Pinarayi Vijayan, emphasised that his party, the Left Democratic Front, has a long-standing commitment to advocating for gender equality. He assured that they are dedicated to providing facilities and protections specifically aimed at empowering women.

The petitioners further argued that these restrictions infringe upon Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits unreasonable discrimination. They highlighted that distinguishing between women based on age—specifically regarding their menstrual status—constitutes an unjustified form of discrimination.

Additionally, they cited violations of Articles 15, 25, and 26 of the Indian Constitution. Article 15 speaks to the prohibition of discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. The petitioners contended that the barriers imposed on women’s entry into the temple are a blatant violation of this article, as they are rooted in discriminatory practices based on sex.

Regarding Article 25, which underscores the freedom of conscience and the right to practise and propagate one’s religion, the petitioners asserted that the existing prohibitions effectively obstruct women's religious freedoms. They argued that these constraints do not align with the essence of this constitutional provision.

Article 26, which affords individuals the freedom to manage their religious affairs, was also referenced in the petitioners’ claims. They argued that the current practices within the Kerala Hindu Place of Public Worship Act, 1965, which enforce restrictions on women's access to the temple, are unconstitutional, as they violate the rights outlined in Articles 14, 15, 25, and 26.

One of the key arguments raised by the petitioners was that the Lord Ayyappa Temple should not be considered a separate religious denomination under Article 26. They pointed out that the rituals and religious observances occurring at the Sabarimala Temple are not fundamentally different from those practised in any other Hindu temples across the country.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

In the ongoing debate regarding the constitutionality of certain practices in Hindu temples, it has been contended that the language found in Article 25(2)(b) underscores the necessity of eliminating caste-based discrimination. Advocates for this position argue that women aged between 10 and 50 years should be permitted to enter any temple freely to exercise their fundamental right to worship. However, the restriction in question is defended as a means of preserving the sanctity of the specific temple dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, particularly in the context of the Naishtika Brahmacharis, who follow a strict vow of celibacy. Proponents assert that these women can visit other temples dedicated to Lord Ayyappa without any hindrance. These customs have been performed for generations, deeply rooted in tradition, and thus are deemed valid under Article 13(3)(b) of the constitution. Furthermore, it is argued that allowing women into this particular temple could potentially distract the male devotees due to the presence of women.

Additionally, it has been highlighted that devotees of Lord Ayyappa form a distinct religious denomination, united under the tenets of Ayyappa Dharma. Each devotee is referred to as "Ayyappan," and those women who are over the age of 50 and permitted entry into the temple are referred to as "Malikipuram," signifying their special status within this faith community.

This perspective is reinforced by the recent ruling of the Kerala High Court in the case of

S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board and Others, 5th April, 1991[3], which recognized Lord Ayyappa as a religious denomination. It is further asserted that the primary objective of Article 17 is to eliminate caste-based untouchability within Hinduism, emphasising that no such discriminatory practices are current in the temple's operations.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ENTRY OF WOMEN

The respondent presents several arguments against the entry of women into certain religious sites. Firstly, they assert that these customs are rooted in long standing traditions that honour the deities of the temple. They point out that women are traditionally barred from entering and worshipping at various sacred places, such as the Brahma Temple in Pushkar, suggesting that these restrictions are part of a broader religious practice.

Furthermore, the respondent argues that the restrictions do not constitute a violation of Articles 15, 25, and 26 of the Constitution of India, as they apply specifically to women of a certain age group rather than to women as a whole. They clarify that if the restrictions were imposed uniformly on all women, then there would be grounds for claiming a violation of the aforementioned constitutional articles.

Additionally, the respondent refers to the Kerala Hindu Place of Worship Act of 1965, which they believe provides legal backing for such restrictions on women's entry into these places of worship, thus reinforcing their position.

JUDGEMENT

The court ruled in favour of the petitioner with a decisive majority of 4:1.

Justice Chandrachud

In his judgement, Justice Chandrachud articulated that imposing restrictions solely on women regarding their right to worship is indicative of a broader subordination of females in society. He emphasised that such exclusionary practices, which are predicated on non-religious, biological factors, suggest that women are incapable of holding onto the 'truth.' This notion perpetuates harmful stereotypes and contributes to systemic discrimination. Additionally, he argued that the prohibition stemming from menstruation is unconstitutional; he highlighted that Article 17 encompasses women as well, asserting that enforcing such practices encourages a patriarchal influence throughout the community.

Justice Mishra

Justice Mishra, in his ruling, firmly stated that any regulations that isolate women and undermine their dignity would be deemed unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution. He further noted that the devotees of Ayyappa had failed to meet the criteria necessary for recognition as a religious denomination, which disqualified them from claiming a separate religious identity. He interpreted the term 'classes and sections' as inclusive of women and called for state-mandated reforms to address these inequalities. Moreover, he invalidated rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules of 1965, arguing that the exclusion of women from prayer services cannot be considered an essential religious practice.

Justice Nariman

Delivering a concurring opinion, Justice Nariman stated that while he could not grant the devotees a separate religious status, he recognized them as Hindus who revere the idol Ayyappa, thus affirming their denominational freedom under Article 25(2)(b). He firmly declared that denying women their right to worship is a constitutional violation.

Justice Malhotra

In contrast, Justice Malhotra presented a dissenting opinion, contending that matters of religious practice are inherently internal to a temple and should be regarded as the temple's private affair, regardless of whether these practices are deemed rational or illogical. She asserted that the temple qualifies as a religious denomination.

While acknowledging that Article 14 provides a right to equality for women, she maintained that this cannot supersede Article 25.

Justice Malhotra rejected the notion that the practice was violative of Article 17, arguing that the discrimination in question was simply an effort to uphold the temple's purity. In her view, the discrimination referenced in Article 17 does not encompass gender-based exclusions, and therefore, the practice did not contravene constitutional provisions.

CONCLUSION

The freedom to practise one’s religion stands as a fundamental right intrinsic to the dignity of every individual, a right that should remain inviolable by both governmental bodies and private entities. Article 25 provides a framework wherein the state holds the authority to impose specific limitations on the right to religious practice, citing considerations related to health, morality, and public order. However, the determination of whether such restrictions genuinely serve the public good, promote social welfare, or address concerns of health and morality ultimately lies within the jurisdiction of the judiciary.

In this context, the court has underscored the vital importance of gender equality and the principle of non-discrimination, asserting that traditional religious customs cannot be wielded as a justification for the discrimination of women. The landmark Sabarimala verdict, in particular, has ignited ongoing debates and ignited critical discussions surrounding the delicate balance between religious freedoms and the imperative of gender equality, especially in relation to the rights of Indigenous communities. While the judgement upheld the principle of equivalence in rights, it simultaneously prompted broader discussions regarding the role of judicial intervention in religious affairs. Critics, for their part, advocate for the autonomy of religious institutions, raising essential questions about the interplay between religious practices and legal oversight.

REFERENCES

Rahul Sinha, (2018) Indian Young Lawyers Association vs. State of Kerala - A Case Analysis

https://blog.ipleaders.in/indian-young-lawyers-association-vs-the-state-of-kerala-2018-a-case-analysis/#Current_status_of_the_case accessed September 28, 2024

Mishra, V. (2019) Brief analysis of Sabarimala temple case Indian Young Lawyers Association vs. Kerala, Legal Service India - Law, Lawyers and Legal Resources

https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-4872-brief-analysis-of-sabarimala-temple-case-indianyoung-lawyers-association-v-s-kerala.html accessed October 4, 2024

Sehgal DR, “Case Comment on Sabarimala Case” (iPleaders, September 29, 2018) https://blog.ipleaders.in/case-comment-sabarimala-case/  accessed October 10, 2024

Vijay J, “S. Mahendran vs the Secretary, Travancore ... on 5 April, 1991” (Scribd) https://www.scribd.com/document/297971119/S-Mahendran-vs-the-Secretary-Travancore-on-5-April-1991 accessed November 14, 2024

[1] S. Mahendran vs. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board and Others, AIR 1993 KERALA 42.

[2] Bennet Coleman and Company and Others vs. Union of India, AIR 1973, SCR (2).

[3]  S. Mahendran vs. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board and Others, AIR 1993 KERALA 42.